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How the Legal Lineage of Obergefell Can Help 




In many ways, it was an expected blow. 
Nevertheless, the Obergefell decision still set conservative circles reeling, a 
fact which exposed a critical weakness: while the coming of the same-sex 
marriage ruling was predictable, its opponents haven’t necessarily articulated 
a response which goes beyond political or theological opposition to gay 
relationships.  For a variety of political and legal reasons, gay marriage is fait 
accompli in the United States; however, this does not mean that the cause is 
lost, particularly for Christians.  Instead, this opens up an opportunity for the 
Christian view of marriage not to stand in opposition to society’s liberalizing 
vision but in antithesis to it. That is, with the legal sword removed as an 
obstacle to so-called marriage equality, the Christian view of marriage 
becomes not an enemy but another option, and that may prove much more 
effective as an avenue for persuasion than it first appears.  
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To learn how this might be the case, we first need to understand the 
decision’s place in the history of the court, then we can seat this within a 
framework of comparable cases, and, finally, we can draw some ideas from 
this to help frame future advocacy. 
 
 The Emerging Jurisprudence of Liberty  
 
First, it is important to recognize that the Obergefell decision is part of a 
solidification of a growing movement on the Supreme Court to define and 
strengthen the concept of “liberty” as a fundamental right guaranteed by the 
Constitution. This is not to say that the United States was founded without a 
fundamental respect for liberty, but a peculiar definition of that right has 
become more prominent in recent jurisprudence, and it represents a move to 
something new that is arguably grounded in a post-modern philosophical 
anthropology that merits criticism. The emergence of a new “liberty” right 
has been largely shaped by the judicial impact of one member of the Court: 
Justice Anthony Kennedy. 
Justice Kennedy is arguably the most influential justice on the Supreme 
Court of the United States at this time. This is because, with the retirement 
of Sandra Day O’Connor in 2006, Kennedy became the sole “swing vote” 
on the Court: that is, on many contentious ideological issues, the Court splits 
between the (formerly) four “Conservative” justices and the four “Liberal” 
justices, with Kennedy unanimously playing the tie-breaking role.1 At the 
same time that Kennedy has taken on this key role, his vision of the nature 
of rights granted by the Constitution has been evolving to embody an 
expanded conception of the right to “liberty” granted by the Due Process 
                                                          
1 According to SCOTUS Blog, Kennedy has been in the majority on 100% of the 5-4 decisions 
since the Court’s 2007 term.  “5-4 Cases, October Term 2013 Stat Pack” SCOTUS Blog 
(accessible via: http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/ 
SCOTUSblog_5-4_cases_OT13.pdf)  
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clause of the 5th and 14th Amendments.2  However, both this conception of 
liberty and its relation to precedent prove problematic. 
For Kennedy, “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.”3 At first 
blush, this might seem like a fitting description of a libertarian freedom of 
conscience, but, digging deeper, issues emerge. For one, this statement makes 
an explicit presumption that one’s beliefs define their personhood, and not 
beliefs only, but the ability to put these beliefs into action, which Kennedy 
describes as “choices central to personal dignity and autonomy.”4 This means 
that human dignity is not inherent, but conditional, and government 
restrictions which limit a freedom of choice are inherently dehumanizing.5  
While this analysis can be helpful in identifying government overreach in 
some circumstances—the restriction of free choice bound up in American 
slavery was dehumanizing in relegating certain persons to the status of 
livestock—it carries with it an implicit assumption that personhood is bound 
up in freedom of choice, something which can be granted or denied by the 
government. Justice Thomas argues forcefully and persuasively in his dissent 
that dignity must be rooted in something other than choice for the simple 
reason that this means that the government cannot take it away, hence its 
designation as an inalienable right.6 
                                                          
2 The Amendments state, in parallel to one another, that persons cannot be “deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of the law.”  U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. 
XIV, § 1. 
3 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) at 851. 
4 Id.  
5 We can see Kennedy reach essentially this conclusion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) 
at 575 (stating that the Bowers precedent upholding sodomy bans “demeans the lives of 
homosexual persons”). 
6 “The corollary of that principle is that human dignity cannot be taken away by the 
government. Slaves did not lose their dignity (any more than they lost their humanity) because 
the government allowed them to be enslaved. Those held in internment camps did not lose 
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Essentially, Kennedy’s concept of liberty is a libertarian sentiment born 
of the same stock that rejects the concept of “legislating morality.” While this 
is a common modern sentiment, its implications chip away at the very 
foundation of a social order, as every legal prescription and proscription 
telling us what we can and can’t do has within it an implied morality. Society 
favors law-abiding behavior, and setting any law legislates the morality of 
continuing in that vein.  For this reason, we largely waste of time to quibble 
over whether a law legislates some “morality,” since this is not only inherent 
to the task of law-making, but deeply rooted in our jurisprudence.7 Our 
nation itself was founded on Enlightenment principles such as the social 
contract, wherein people sacrifice some measure of personal autonomy of 
choice for the greater goal of social order. If a restriction of choice or a 
restriction of action along the lines of majoritarian morals is to be counted 
dehumanizing, then the entire enterprise of government itself must be said 
to have this effect. 
While Kennedy’s philosophical anthropology stands to a degree at odds 
with the Enlightenment principles animating the Constitution, it raises even 
deeper issues for someone professing a Christian view. From this 
perspective, Kennedy’s vision implies a philosophical anthropology which 
says people are persons in their most fully realized sense only when they 
operate as a law unto themselves, free to “be who they are” without the 
disapproving glares of society. At its base, then, this is a view of mankind 
which falls prey to the same desires that first led humanity astray in the 
Garden. Although made in His image, we often long not to serve, but to be 
                                                          
their dignity because the government confined them. And those denied governmental benefits 
certainly do not lose their dignity because the government denies them those benefits. The 
government cannot bestow dignity, and it cannot take it away.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 
2584, 2639 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
7 Indeed, the police power long recognized as belonging to the states includes the right to 
legislate in the interest of the general welfare, including its morality.  See, e.g. Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (Upholding mandatory vaccination laws over personal 
objections on the basis of the state’s interest in the common welfare). 
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God, and we chafe at the notion that anyone ultimately possesses the ability 
to restrict our delusion.   
I will work this out at more depth later, but it is worth at this point 
positing what an alternative Christian philosophical anthropology might be.  
John Witte, in his excellent work God’s Joust, God’s Justice, traces the 
development of the concept of rights in the western tradition, particularly 
since the Reformation. In the book, Witte highlights the important and often 
neglected contributions of Luther and some of the early Reformers to a view 
of the state grounded in an essential view of persons as simul iustus et peccator: 
since mankind stands equal before the throne of God, individuals should 
likewise stand equal before the bar of God’s delegated hand of justice in this 
world (that is, government). At the same time, since mankind is plagued by 
sin, the government should serve as a restraint on evil, and mankind’s own 
tendency to abuse such power should be checked and balanced through the 
divine institutions of church, home, and state.8 This idea would be developed 
further by statesman Abraham Kuyper to the concept of sphere sovereignty, 
a notion which he would define politically by the principle that “political 
authority operates alongside many other authorities that are equally absolute 
and sacred in the natural and spiritual world, in society and family.  Every 
attempt by political authority to try and rule over one of those other areas is 
therefore a violation of God’s ordinances and resistance to it is not a crime 
but a duty.”9 
So how might this view of human nature and the purpose of the state 
stand at odds with Kennedy’s formulation?  To start, this view affirms the 
notion that human dignity and equality are innate and inalienable, and the 
government overreaches where it seeks to restrict those things.  Given the 
varied substantive definitions, this might not stand at odds with Kennedy’s 
concept of dignity, but the notion that individuals are communally governed 
                                                          
8 John Witte Jr., God’s Joust, God’s Justice: Law and Religion in the Western Tradition, 38-41 (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans 2006). 
9 Abraham Kuyper, Our Program 21, trans. and ed. by Harry Van Dyke (Lexham Press 2015). 
Procla im L iberty  
235  
by a variety of institutions serves a caution for the notion that any perceived 
mistreatment of an individual be remedied solely by the government.  If the 
family is anchored in the institution of marriage, and if that entity serves as a 
co-regent over individuals, then the government should be exceedingly 
cautious about stepping in to try to redefine the boundaries under which that 
institution operates.  Yes, because of human sin, the government may act as 
a check on abuses within the family, but weighing in to enforce a new 
definition of that entity should be a last, rather than first, resort.  In the view 
of sphere sovereignty, the state should take a more modest role that supports 
the flourishing of other spheres, one which favors the enforcement of so-
called negative liberties10 over the expansion of positive liberties.11  This is 
not to say that no positive liberties are recognized, but when the Court is 
going to mandate entitlement to them, it must be careful in doing so. 
More could be said on the root issues which lie behind a postmodern 
concept of liberty, but the primary importance to my thesis here is to 
highlight this root problem and see how it has been applied so that we might 
begin to formulate a response to it, and, with this explanation of the 
definitional concern, we can turn to its application. 
 
Progressive Fundamentals  
 
In my discussion above, I asserted that the thrust of Kennedy’s 
philosophical anthropology stands at odds with the very enterprise of 
government.  This is not an assertion that Kennedy himself stands at odds 
with that enterprise, it is a reductio ad absurdum which illustrates that the 
capacity of choice is an inappropriate grounding for human dignity.  Indeed, 
no Justice on the Supreme Court believes that someone’s fundamental self-
                                                          
10 That is, the right to be free from interference in things like privacy, speech, and religious 
exercise. 
11 That is, the right to assert a positive entitlement to something, such as a right to healthcare, 
food, or a living wage. 
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identification as a cannibal would entitle them to fully realize their 
personhood by killing and eating another person.  Instead, even if we were 
to adopt Kennedy’s approach, we would see universal agreement that some 
line must be drawn restricting a person’s liberty to fully express themselves, 
but deciding exactly where this line would be drawn would be difficult, and, 
when that line is drawn by the Supreme Court, it has a deep national impact 
which may have unintended consequences.  For these reasons, a concern for 
judicial restraint has established a jurisprudence in the Court that only those 
“principle(s) of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people as to be ranked as fundamental.”12  The Obergefell majority does not 
completely eschew this line of analysis, but they do twist it by application of 
a progressive, teleological hermeneutic to history that forces precedent to 
dance to their tune.   
In Obergefell, the majority seats its analysis in a mixed narrative of both 
continuity and change.  It hangs its precedential hat on the hook that marriage 
has been long recognized as a fundamental right, but it emphasizes a narrative 
of change to argue that the substantive definition of marriage itself is an 
evolving concept.  In doing so, the majority plays a sort of bait and switch, 
taking the part it most likes about the traditional right to marriage but gutting 
the concept of any static meaning, and this is not the first time that this sort 
of tactic has been applied, but before we consider other examples of this 
                                                          
12 See, e.g. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934) at 105. Justice Alito also argues this point 
in his dissent. Obergefell at 2640-41 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Our Nation was founded upon the 
principle that every person has the unalienable right to liberty, but liberty is a term of many 
meanings. For classical liberals, it may include economic rights now limited by government 
regulation. For social democrats, it may include the right to a variety of government benefits. 
For today’s majority, it has a distinctively postmodern meaning. 
To prevent five unelected Justices from imposing their personal vision of liberty upon the 
American people, the Court has held that “liberty” under the Due Process Clause should be 
understood to protect only those rights that are “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.’” Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-721, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 138 L. Ed. 2d 
772 (1997). And it is beyond dispute that the right to same-sex marriage is not among those 
rights.”). 
Procla im L iberty  
237  
hermeneutic in action, we should how it operates in this case with greater 
precision. 
 
A. Obergefell relies on a Progressive, Teleological Hermeneutic 
Speaking for the majority, Justice Kennedy starts his rhetorical 
movement first by emphasizing the centrality of marriage: “From their 
beginning to their most recent page, the annals of human history reveal the 
transcendent importance of marriage.”13  From this point, the majority 
moves quickly to seat the definition of marriage within a context of evolution 
and change that stands parallel to an ever-mounting recognition of the rights 
of homosexual persons. Kennedy starts his historical review with the 
assertion that marriage was once a matter of parental negotiation over various 
political, religious, and financial concerns.  This evolved into a view of 
marriage as a “single, male-dominated legal entity” which was abandoned 
when “society began to understand that women have their own equal 
dignity.”  Citing a line of legal developments seeing a similar increase in the 
recognition of the dignity of homosexuals, the majority sees the availability 
of marriage to these individuals as a logical next step.  Reviewing the 
evolution of marriage, Kennedy asserts that “[t]hese new insights have 
strengthened, not weakened, the institution of marriage,” and it’s clear from 
his opinion that he sees the expansion into same-sex marriage in much the 
same light.14 
After placing marriage in a context of cultural change and evolution, 
Kennedy reaffirms the centrality and fundamental nature of marriage within 
our legal system.  He cites significant legal history upholding marriage as a 
fundamental right, saying that these were a reflection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s guarantee of protection from deprivation of “life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law,” and he speaks of that liberty interest 
                                                          
13 Obergefell at 2593-94. 
14 Id. at 2595-97. 
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in the sense discussed above.15  He moves from this re-centering on the 
fundamental nature of marriage to elucidate four reasons for why marriage is 
fundamental, and Kennedy brings his analysis home by arguing that each of 
these four purposes are either equally applicable to or even furthered by same 
sex marriage. 
First, the majority argues that “the right to personal choice regarding 
marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.”  The majority 
draws language directly from precedent in cases like Loving v. Virginia, which 
said the freedom to marry “resides with the individual and cannot be 
infringed by the State.”  By this line of reasoning, marriage should be available 
to anyone, subject only to their personal preferences and the consent of a 
willing spouse (or spouses).16 
Second, the Court argues that marriage “supports a two-person union 
unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.”17  This 
argument is tied into the first, seeing marriage as a way for people to define 
their identities by reference to their commitment to another person.  By the 
logic of the liberty interest that Kennedy favors, it is then dehumanizing to 
limit the self-actualization available to those who choose the avenue of 
marriage to craft their identities. 
Kennedy carries this logic further with his third argument, that marriage 
“safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights 
of childrearing, procreation, and education.”18  While stating that same sex 
couples can provide loving homes, the majority makes the unstated 
assumption that these homes are in every way equal to mixed gender 
households, meaning that current marriage laws run afoul of equal protection 
and actually “harm and humiliate the children of same-sex couples” because 
they create the stigma that same sex parents are somehow less desirable.19 
                                                          
15 Id. at 2597-98. 
16 Id. at 2599. 
17 Id. at 2599. 
18 Id. at 2600-01. 
19 Id. at 2601. 
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Finally, Kennedy reiterates that “[m]arriage is a keystone of our social 
order.”  Kennedy cites the 1888 decision of Maynard v. Hill, saying “marriage 
is ‘the foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be 
neither civilization nor progress.’”  He then mentions that this sentiment “has 
been reiterated even as the institution has evolved in substantial ways over 
time.”  However, Kennedy’s primary argument on this point seems to be that 
marriage, as central to the social order, carries with it a wide variety of legal 
and material benefits, which it is unfair to deny to same-sex couples.20  
Looking over the fabric of this argument, it becomes clear that several 
assumptions are at play which seriously skew the result.  For one, the majority 
does not answer the point made by the various dissents that one consistent 
feature across all of the historical examples given is that marriage in all of 
those cases was between a man and a woman.  Far from being an accidental 
anomaly, the majority’s own acknowledgement of the family orientation of 
marriage points to the essential aspect of this characteristic across historic 
marriage practice.  Secondly, other than the fact that homosexual individuals 
seek to marry and society has been increasingly inclined to sympathy toward 
the group, there’s little about Kennedy’s arguments on the four fundamental 
aspects of marriage that necessitates extending marriage to same-sex couples 
unless that is an a priori inclination.  While one might recognize an equal 
access claim to have marriage as one would like it (addressing the first 
foundation), little argumentation is given to link the other foundations 
beyond the fact that same-sex couples can love one another and children.  
Again, the reasoning serves the foregone conclusion. 
At the end of the day, even the majority would not contest that same-sex 
marriage is a new innovation; however, the majority has a vision of history 
marching forward from a backward past into a progressively enlightened 
future that somehow makes this innovation simultaneously new and rooted 
in tradition all at once. 
 
                                                          
20 Id. at 2601-02. 
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B. This Hermeneutic is not new 
Of course, this is not the first time that historical or precedential analysis 
has been cast in a way that skews the result.  The dissents in Obergefell focus 
on comparing the majority’s reasoning to the now-abandoned progeny of 
Lochner v. New York, a period in the Court’s history where an invented notion 
of freedom of contract led the Court to invalidate a number of labor 
reforms.21  However, there are far more recent and valuable points of 
comparison, specifically in Roe v. Wade,  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and 
Lawrence v. Texas. 
This approach reared its head notably in the somewhat convoluted 
reasoning underpinning the Roe v. Wade majority.  Section VI of Roe is a litany 
of historical precedent designed to suggest that opposition to abortion is a 
relatively new invention.  While citing some contrary precedent, the majority 
argues that earlier society did not treat abortion, especially before quickening 
– the beginning of observable fetal movement – as homicide, then it uses this 
analysis to suggest that society was much more accepting of abortion than 
recent developments.22  While the Court only takes its analysis so far as 
finding the decision to terminate a pregnancy to be a protected matter of 
privacy, it still fashions this fundamental seemingly on the assertion that 
abortion was permissible at some point through history, conveniently 
sidestepping the fact that quickening was long viewed as the beginning of life 
such that the historical consensus on opposing the termination of prenatal 
life was much more uniform than the majority suggested. 
While Roe took the first step of a jurisprudence that would be embraced 
in Obergefell, it sat on shaky ground until the second step was made in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey.  In shoring up the legal case for abortion, Casey leaned 
heavily on the precedential value of Roe while making the important shift 
from defending abortion as a private decision to a matter of liberty and 
                                                          
21 See, e.g., Obergefell at 2617 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
22 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 129-48 (1973). 
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autonomy that a woman is entitled to make.23  In doing this, Casey cast the 
scope of liberty quite broadly.  In addition to the quote discussed previously 
regarding the anthropological underpinnings of Kennedy’s approach to 
liberty,24 Casey openly discarded any specific limitation to the scope of the 
liberty interest protected by the 5th and 14th Amendments, saying “[n]either 
the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the 
substantive sphere of liberty which the Fourteenth Amendment protects.”25  
The majority then went even further to quote Justice Harlan’s dissent from 
Poe v. Ullman, where he said the right to liberty “is a rational continuum which, 
broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary 
impositions and purposeless restraints, ... and which also recognizes, what a 
reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require 
particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their 
abridgment.”26  The conclusion reached was that, since reasonable minds 
could disagree as to abortion, the government had no business banning it, at 
least in the early stages of pregnancy.   
In Lawrence v. Texas, Justice Kennedy first brought these two rhetorical 
moves together in an opinion which invalidated Texas’ anti-sodomy laws.  
Kennedy began the body of his analysis by tracing decisions such as Griswold 
v. Connecticut (finding prohibitions on contraceptives to married couples 
violated their right to privacy) and then subtly shifting the grounds of analysis 
away from a focus on the negative liberty of privacy, that is, keeping the 
government out of certain affairs, and toward grounding this right in what 
the majority characterizes as the broader, encompassing right to liberty.27  In 
fact, Kennedy would reason his rejection of Texas’ anti-sodomy statutes not 
as a matter of infringing on typically private relations but because it infringed 
                                                          
23 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 (1992). 
24 See supra n.3. 
25 Casey at 848. 
26 Id. 
27 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564-68 (2003). 
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on an individual’s choice of sexual activity, something Kennedy found to 
“demean the lives of homosexual persons.”28   
Again, like in Obergefell, Kennedy was not content simply to shift the 
grounds of analysis from privacy to his preferred liberty framework, he also 
cast a highly skewed gloss over history to suggest that social opposition to 
homosexual activity was of relatively recent vintage, and a vintage that was 
more recently being repudiated by broader society.29  He did this to suggest 
that the legal reasoning in the case explicitly overturned in Lawrence, Bowers v. 
Hardwick, had been wrongly decided when it found no fundamental right to 
engage in sodomy.  The dissent excoriates Kennedy for this move, pointing 
out that the Constitution only prevents states from infringing fundamental 
liberty rights and that Kennedy’s historical analysis is selective at best, if not 
outright deceptive.30  By any fair analysis, the majority’s claim here that any 
right to same sex relationships might be deeply rooted in our Nation’s history 
is suspect at best. 
Taken as a whole, the rhetorical approach taken in Obergefell is troubling, 
but hardly new.  It is a hallmark of the Court’s more activist decisions, but 
that doesn’t mean that those decisions don’t have a lasting legal impact, and 
perhaps the legacy of Roe is most instructive as a point of comparison on this 
front. 
 
Learning from the Past:  Roe Advocacy 
 
As explained above, abortion has seen historical exegesis and an eventual 
precedential argument that mirrors what was used to justify Obergefell, and, in 
many ways, this makes it an excellent test case for strategizing what the way 
forward can look like.  In this regard, there are two principal messages that I 
                                                          
28 Id. at 575. 
29 Id. at 567-572. 
30 Id. at 592-598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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think are particularly important: first, this precedent is unlikely to go away, 
and, second, this does not mean that opposition to this holding is doomed. 
With perhaps the exception of Lochner, the lesson of most of the more 
activist judicial opinions of the past century is that they stick around.  In 
general, conservative justices are less apt than liberal ones to upset settled 
precedent, and, despite strong initial backlash to Roe, Casey marked what was 
likely the high water mark in seeking to repeal the earlier decision.  While 
Casey did alter the rules of the game in ways that are yet unresolved, it upheld 
the essential holding of Roe, and, after so many years, it’s unlikely that any but 
the most lopsidedly conservative future Supreme Court would ever disturb 
that.  Given the moderate to significant step left that Justice Scalia’s recent 
death likely signals for the Court, it’s unlikely that there will be a coalition 
anytime in the near future to disturb the consensus behind Obergefell.31  Given 
this fact, the traditional marriage movement wastes some of its valuable 
political capital if it pushes for an absolutist rollback of the decision.  After 
all, even if Obergefell were overturned today, that would not invalidate same-
sex marriage, only return the issue to the States, a significant number of 
whom already recognized the practice. 
However, I don’t think this is grounds for losing hope as to advocacy 
around this issue.  Abortion is a good comparison case because it is, in many 
ways, a comparable social hot button, but one with a longer history behind it 
than the relatively recent successes of the gay rights movement.  Also, with 
this issue, there are some reasons for optimism.  Firstly, Gallup polling has 
shown not only a resurgence of the pro-life position since its low ebb in the 
1990s, but this change in the wind has been led by an increasing opposition 
to abortion among the 18 to 29-year-old demographic.32  This suggests that 
there was a period in the wake of Roe which saw increased support for 
                                                          
31 Whether the Senate moves to confirm an Obama nominee or the Democratic candidate 
wins the presidential election, the majority of most likely scenarios see a leftward shift for the 
Court. 
32 Lydia Saad, Generational Differences on Abortion Narrow, Gallup (March 12, 2010), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/126581/generational-differences-abortion-narrow.aspx. 
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abortion, particularly as issues came to a point near the decision of Casey.  The 
data is insufficient to draw a causal link between the high water mark of 
efforts to repeal Roe and the waning support for abortion, particularly those 
that say it should be legal in all circumstances, but the correlation is clear.  
Again, while causation is unproven, it would not be inconsistent with 
information we have about the polarizing effects of more confrontational 
approaches to the issue, and a heightening of the culture war dynamic around 
that time might have actually done more harm than good.  Regardless of why, 
however, polling does indicate that something about the pro-life position has 
been becoming more attractive, and this may have to do with a shift in 
approach among those who advocate for it. 
One very successful approach that departed from the culture war 
dynamic was pioneered by the Vitae Foundation and first described in a 
ground-breaking essay on the website First Things back in April of 1998.  In 
that essay, Paul Swope, a project director with the foundation, described a 
radical reimagining of pro-life advocacy around an empathetic understanding 
of the psychology of a woman faced with an unwanted pregnancy.  In 
extensive research, the organization learned that women would tend to carry 
their children to term when “guilt wins out over shame, when they feel that 
the pregnancy will not end their own current and future selves, and that the 
unborn will be better off alive than dead.”33  Taking their research to heart, 
the foundation sponsored a thirteen week television campaign in the Boston 
area in 1997.  In independent polling conducted to test the effectiveness of 
these advertisements, the study showed a 7% increase (308,000 people) in the 
population supporting the pro-life position, a shift that was explicitly linked 
to those who remembered the foundation’s advertisements.34  While unlikely 
to lead to total victory for the pro-life movement, this type of advocacy has 
                                                          
33 Charles T. Kenney & Paul Swope, A New Understanding of the Trauma of Abortion, Vitae 
Foundation (January 2015), 
http://vitaefoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/trauma-of-abortion-long.pdf. 
34 Paul Swope, Abortion: A Failure to Communicate, First Things (April 1998), 
http://www.firstthings.com/article/1998/04/004-abortion-a-failure-to-communicate. 
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a tremendous cumulative effect, and the traditional marriage movement can 
learn much from modeling this type of approach. 
 
Leaning into the Future: Holistic Advocacy  
 
Moving forward, I believe that my analysis shows that the root issue 
which brought about the Obergefell decision is not just an isolated political 
preference for the gay lobby but a fundamentally different approach to both 
government and, ultimately, philosophical anthropology, that favors a 
radically self-centered view of the person.  For those locked in a worldview 
that sees personhood as the ability to define the rules of their own universe 
around their personal desires, it will be incredibly difficult to achieve 
persuasive traction on the issue of marriage.  This becomes evident when we 
pursue the same empathic line of reasoning that the Vitae Foundation used 
to drive its pro-life advocacy.   
The Pro-life Movement is faced with a much more winnable battle when 
advocating for unborn children.  As described above, it seeks to help balance 
guilt over shame.  Where typical culture war-type advocacy focuses on piling 
on the guilt, the Vitae Foundation worked to chip away at the perception of 
shame.  Where the typical pro-life advocacy focuses on the definitional life 
of the unborn child, the Vitae Foundation addresses the nearer issue for 
women in their self-identification and supports the idea that a woman’s 
identity/self will not be lost by carrying a child to term.  The power of 
empathy helped to focus the movement on the parts of the balance that 
struck most closely to women facing the abortion decision, but, ultimately, 
pro-life advocacy could be successful without having to challenge the 
fundamental worldview of self-definition.   
With traditional marriage, the task will be more difficult, because the 
decision involved is about resolving a personal dissonance between sexual 
desires and self-expression weighed against potential shame and 
interpersonal backlash.  Furthermore, the point of decision isn’t at the point 
of getting married.  Instead, this path is largely embarked upon around the 
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time an individual is considering whether or not to come out.  At that level, 
the LGBT movement has been very successful in both encouraging people 
to be their “authentic selves” while working to minimize the social stigma of 
making the transition.  Both the pregnant woman and the closeted person 
face the same perceived future of a destruction of the self in the face of an 
untenable status quo, but while pro-life advocates can help relieve that 
tension by helping women come to peace with who they perceive themselves 
to be (moral people), traditional marriage advocates would need to convince 
someone that they’ve had their fundamental assumptions wrong all along.    
This is not to say I believe the cause to be lost, just that this line of 
analysis suggests that a more fundamental strategy must be taken.  Drawing 
our cues from the pro-life movement, I don’t believe that we invest our 
resources well if we rely on winning victory through the courts or even by 
Constitutional amendment, legislative workaround or any other of the typical 
tools in the culture warrior toolkit.  Instead, we must see this as a fundamental 
effort to shift worldviews.  We should seek to emphasize the deficiencies of 
a worldview centered on self-definition, recognizing that, while we do have 
individual characteristics, our personhood has a relational dimension to it.  
We are who we are because we have been endowed with certain 
characteristics by our Creator, and this not to pursue life, liberty, and 
happiness in isolation, but because our happiness is best seated in lives lived 
in joyful service to both our God and to one another.  These ideas, that we 
save our lives by losing them, that we find ourselves by giving up ourselves, 
that we stand simultaneously individual and collective, sinner and (for those 
in Christ) saint, are foolishness to the world’s wisdom, yet they resonate 
deeply for those who can hear their Savior’s call.  Rather than fighting in the 
front lines of the marriage wars (which aren’t even the front lines of the 
persuasive fight), we should step back and see where we can offer a different 
way to those struggling with who they are.  Authors like Debra Hirsch make 
a start at this sort of thing by helping to give a more holistic view of sexuality 
that moves past defining a person by their genital preferences.  In her book, 
Redeeming Sex, she talks frankly about her own transition out of lesbianism 
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not because someone sat her down and told her it was wrong, but because 
she realized that there was more to her sexuality than her sexual partners.35  
This is the type of reasoning that offers a genuine alternative to those 
wrestling with sexual orientation.  It doesn’t ask people to rewire their desires 
but to broaden their horizons.  While desire may shift over time, a broader, 
more holistic, and communally integrated view of the person allows for 
someone to face the thought of abstaining from desired behavior without 
viewing that as a subversion or reduction of the self.   
Of course, all of these ideas will only work if the Christian community 
and others in the traditional marriage camp can live them out themselves, and 
this may mean coming face to face with the frank realization that we all feel 
the seductive call of the ethos behind Kennedy’s definition of “liberty,” not 
because it’s a reflection of truth, but because our sinful parents were wooed 
by the very same inclination in the Garden.  Ultimately, we must ourselves 
live better and model the alternative way, allowing us to stand not primarily 
in opposition, but in antithesis to the way of the world.  After all, the struggle 
with Obergefell is rooted in a view of who we are as persons that makes each 
of us a law unto ourselves, and the Christian church has been called to 
struggle against that worldview from the very beginning.  We have not given 
up that struggle since, and we should not give it up now, but we should still 









                                                          
35 Debra Hirsh, Redeeming Sex: Naked Conversations about Sexuality and Spirituality (Downers 
Grove: InterVarsity, 2015). 
